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A Path Towards Arctic Presence: Stricter 
Regulation as the First Step in Free Navigation 
 
LUKE A. SANDERS† 
 
The Arctic ice cap is melting. As the ice recedes, shipping lanes are opening that present shorter 
transport routes across the top of the globe. Industry analysts predict an Arctic shipping boom 
in coming years. In response, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) implemented a 
Polar Code (the “Polar Code” or the “Code”) to place heightened environmental and safety 
requirements on ships traversing the Arctic and Antarctic regions. These rules are binding on 
the United States, and the U.S. Coast Guard published the rulemaking for Polar Ship 
requirements. However, the rules have multiple shortcomings and loopholes. At the IMO, 
conversations have begun regarding how a “Polar Code Phase II” could be instituted to help 
further mitigate risk. 
 
Meanwhile, the United States is unprepared for the coming Arctic surge. Although the gateway 
to these new routes runs through the Bering Sea, largely in U.S.-controlled waters, the nation 
lacks the ice-capable ships and northern infrastructure to facilitate safe navigation. Conversely, 
Russia is investing heavily in its Arctic fleet and building the infrastructure to support them. It 
has implemented restrictions and imposed harsh tariffs on vessels transiting this “Northern Sea 
Route.” While these actions run counter to the U.S. Freedom of Navigation policy (and possibly 
international law), the United States lacks the Arctic presence to influence its neighbor to ease 
restrictions on these future shipping lanes. 
 
This Note examines how stricter U.S. regulation of Arctic shipping can lead to a greater physical 
presence and peaceful assertion of American geopolitical will. A Coast Guard-led rulemaking 
based on the proposals for Polar Code Phase II, which fills the aforementioned gaps in the 
current regulatory scheme, would provide increased protections for the Arctic environment. This 
Note predicts how this regulatory effort could set in motion a chain of events with beneficial 
impacts on trade, the Coast Guard, and American foreign policy goals. New rules could serve 
as a proof-of-concept for the IMO and incentivize the use of Arctic shipping lanes by lowering 
assessed risk and reducing insurance costs. The resulting shipping increase should create a 
natural need for more Coast Guard assets to ensure safe and secure navigation. Finally, this 
Note will assess how the combined presence of Coast Guard assets and multinational shippers, 
eager for free navigation, could place pressure on Russia to loosen its restrictions on the 
Northern Sea Route. 
 
 
† Luke A. Sanders is a J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Class 
of 2020. He holds a B.S. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. 
The Author would like to thank Professor Dave Owen for his guidance and Professor Emeritus John Leshy for 
his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note. He would also like to thank Anna Sanders for her patience. 
For any questions concerning this Note, please contact Luke directly at lasanders@uchastings.edu. 
 
[229] 
I - SANDERS_18 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2019 11:18 AM 
 
230 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:229 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 231 
I. A CHANGING NORTH AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE 
ARCTIC ..................................................................................................................... 235 
A. THE CHANGING CLIMATE AND OPENING SHIPPING LANES ............ 236 
B. ALASKA, MARITIME POLLUTION, AND SAFETY OF LIFE AT 
SEA ................................................................................................................... 237 
C. RUSSIA AND THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION DISPUTE .................... 238 
II. POLAR CODE AND THE LACK OF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESENCE ............... 239 
A. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE SO FAR ............................ 240 
B. GAPS IN THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME .................................. 242 
III. THE POSITIVE IMPACTS OF INCREASED REGULATION ................................. 247 
A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADOPT NEW REGULATIONS TO 
ADDRESS CURRENT REGULATORY SHORTCOMINGS ........................ 248 
B. U.S. REGULATION AS A BASIS FOR IMO POLAR CODE 
PHASE II ....................................................................................... 249 
C. INCREASED REGULATION PROMOTES A SAFER ENVIRONMENT AND 
COULD INCENTIVIZE POLAR NAVIGATION .......................................... 251 
D. REGULATIONS NEED TO BE ENFORCED—THE CASE FOR MORE 
COAST GUARD CUTTERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE ............................. 254 
E. PRESENCE EQUALS INFLUENCE: PRESSURE ON RUSSIA AND 
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE ........... 257 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 259 
I - SANDERS_18 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2019 11:18 AM 
 
December 2019] A PATH TOWARDS ARCTIC PRESENCE 231 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In August and September 2018, the cargo vessel Venta Maersk 
traversed the Arctic waters north of the Russian Federation and delivered its 
cargo from the Pacific port of Vladivostok to St. Petersburg.1 While this record- 
setting first was only a “trial passage” through the Northern Sea Route (NSR),2 
Venta Maersk’s transit is an example of the maritime industry’s push for 
transport and vessel traffic through the Arctic. This follows on the heels of a 
Russian-built liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker completing the journey a year 
prior—without the aid of an icebreaker.3 The ice is melting, and long-dreamed- 
of shipping lanes are opening up.4 
The receding Arctic ice and potential shipping route revolution 
implicates U.S. interests in a number of ways.5 Transit through the Bering Strait 
or otherwise near the Alaska coastal zone is necessary to access either the NSR 
or the Northwest Passage (NWP) across the roof of Alaska and Canada.6 The 
region is hazardous to navigate due to weather extremes, remoteness, and a lack 
of infrastructure and U.S. Coast Guard (“the Coast Guard”) response assets in 
the area.7 An oil spill or other nautical disaster could have long-lasting impacts 
on the ecology and economy of the region and would be costly to the U.S. 
government and maritime industry stakeholders.8 This includes some of the 
largest fisheries and fishing fleets in the world.9 
 
 
1. Tom Embury-Dennis, Container Ship Crosses Arctic Route for First Time in History Due to Melting 
Sea Ice, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 18, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/maersk- 
container-ship-arctic-ocean-northern-sea-route-venta-global-warming-a8543431.html; L.G., What is the 
Northern Sea Route?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist- 
explains/2018/09/24/what-is-the-northern-sea-route. 
2. Embury-Dennis, supra note 1. 
3. Russell Goldman, Russian Tanker Completes Arctic Passage Without Aid of Icebreakers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/world/europe/russia-tanker-christophe-de- 
margerie.html; see also Sean Fahey, Access Control: Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic and the Russian Northern 
Sea Route Regime, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 154, 158 (2018). 
4. Goldman, supra note 3; Nengye Liu, Can the Polar Code Save the Arctic?, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: 
INSIGHTS (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/7/can-polar-code-save-arctic. 
5. Arctic Sea Ice Minimum, NASA: GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic- 
sea-ice/ (last updated Oct. 22, 2019). 
6. Henri Féron, A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Arctic Thaw, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 83, 91 (2018). 
For a summary of vessel traffic in the region, see U.S. COAST GUARD, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: PORT ACCESS 
ROUTE STUDY: IN THE CHUKCHI SEA, BERING STRAIT, AND BERING SEA (2016) [hereinafter PORT ACCESS ROUTE 
STUDY], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USCG-2014-0941-0040. 
7. Fahey, supra note 3, at 174; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE: FISCAL YEAR 
2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2018) [hereinafter ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE], 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USCG%20%20Arctic%20Search%20and%20Rescue_1.pd 
f; U.S. COAST GUARD, BERING SEA AND ARCTIC OCEAN POLLUTION RESPONSE (2018) [hereinafter ARCTIC 
OCEAN POLLUTION RESPONSE], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USCG%20- 
%20Bering%20Sea%20and%20Arctic%20Ocean%20Pollution%20Response.pdf. 
8. See, e.g., Maurie J. Cohen, Economic Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, in J. STEVEN PICOU ET AL., 
THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM 133 (1997) (examining the 
economic impacts of the Exxon Valdez spill); Féron, supra note 6, at 106. 
9. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 2016 vii–ix (2017). 
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The United States also has broader geopolitical disputes, especially with 
Russia. Arctic shipping routes are an opportunity for cost and time savings, 
providing a shorter voyage than traditional routes through the Suez Canal (“the 
Suez”).10 However, Russia has made sweeping claims to Arctic territory,11 
restricting access to the NSR.12 Russian restrictions could erase potential cost 
savings by burdening shippers with fees and required escorts.13 Moreover, these 
restrictions conflict with the United States’ longstanding policy of freedom of 
navigation.14 The United States calls for “adher[ence] to the customary 
international law rules” as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.15 
Unfortunately, the United States lacks the assets required to assert such 
a policy. While Russia has a fleet of Arctic-capable vessels at its disposal, the 
Coast Guard has just two such vessels—one of which is typically deployed to 
supply Antarctic scientists.16 This, paired with a lack of infrastructure in 
 
10. AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING, NAVIGATING THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: STATUS AND GUIDANCE 2 (2014), 
http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternalPortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/Capability%20 
Brochures/NSR_Advisory; Fahey, supra note 3. 
11. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Presents Revised Claim of Arctic Territory to the United Nations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/world/europe/russia-to-present-revised-claim-of- 
arctic-territory-to-the-united-nations.html; Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Stakes New Claim to Expanse in the 
Arctic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/kremlin-stakes-claim- 
to-arctic-expanse-and-its-resources.html; see also H. Edwin Anderson, III, Polar Shipping, The Forthcoming 
Polar Code and Implications for the Polar Environments, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 62–64 (2012); Fahey, supra 
note 3, at 167–75. 
12. Fahey, supra note 3, at 159; Atle Staalesen, Deputy Prime Minister Supports Foreign Sailing 
Restrictions on Northern Sea Route, BARENTS OBSERVER (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2018/09/deputy-prime-minister-supports-foreign- 
sailing-restrictions-northern-sea. While Canada has also placed restrictions on the NWP, it does not yet present 
as viable an alternative to traditional routes. Hugh Stephens, The Opening of the Northern Sea Routes: The 
Implications for Global Shipping and for Canada’s Relations with Asia, 9 U. CALGARY: SCH. PUB. POL’Y RES. 
PAPERS 8 (2016), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/northern-sea-routes-stephens.pdf; 
see also Féron, supra note 6, at 92. 
13. See Fahey, supra note 3, at 170; AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 10, at 9; Dr. Bjørn Gunnarsson, 
CTR. FOR HIGH N. LOGISTICS, Practical Information for Operating on the Northern Sea Route 4, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170204043319/http://chnl.no/?page=111&show=113&title=PP+Presentations. 
14. William J. Aceves, The Freedom of Navigation Program: A Study of the Relationship Between Law 
and Politics, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 265 (1996); Maritime Security and Navigation, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity//index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
2019). 
15. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 14; The guiding international law documents on free navigation and 
innocent passage are included in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. For a discussion of UNCLOS as it relates to U.S. freedom of navigation 
policy, see Fahey, supra note 3, at 162–68. 
16. David Vergun, Coast Guard Commandant Wants Bigger Arctic Presence—How Cool Is That?, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF.: P’SHIPS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1705544/coast-guard- 
commandant-wants-bigger-arctic-presence-how-cool-is-that/; Ben Werner, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter 
Funding Frozen by Capitol Hill Budget Negotiations, U.S. NAVAL INST. NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:47 PM), 
https://news.usni.org/2018/12/19/coast-guard-ice-breaker-funding-frozen-by-capitol-hill-budget-negations. The 
2019 appropriations bill provides for one more icebreaker; this will be discussed infra Subpart III.D. However, 
for a preview of the issue, see Ben Werner, Coast Guard Secures $655 Million for Polar Security Cutters in New 
Budget         Deal,         U.S.        NAVAL        INST.        NEWS (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:06 PM), 
https://news.usni.org/2019/02/15/polar_security_cutter_coast_guard. 
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Northern Alaska,17 prevents the United States from being able to effectively 
respond to a mishap. Additionally, it prevents the Coast Guard from enforcing 
freedom of navigation in the area and reduces its ability to provide escorts using 
military vessels.18 The Coast Guard needs more vessels equipped for Arctic 
operations if the United States is to exert its influence in the region. 
The United States is also tied to maritime activity in the region by treaty. 
In response to increased maritime activity and the changing climate,19 the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) passed binding regulations for ships 
operating in polar waters.20 The United States, a signatory to this body, adopted 
this Polar Code via regulation.21 The new regulations went into effect in July 
2018.22 While these regulations are a milestone multilateral agreement, the Polar 
Code’s shortcomings, paired with the United States’ reluctance (or inability) to 
procure more Coast Guard vessels, means the nation cannot effectively respond 
to its interests in the Arctic.23 
To respond to this problem, the United States should take what might 
initially appear to be a counterintuitive first step: enact new regulations. The 
Coast Guard should promulgate a new rulemaking to implement stricter 
regulations for vessels operating in Arctic waters.24 Stricter regulations would 
reduce risk to the Arctic environment and increase safety of life at sea. The need 
 
 
17. See ARCTIC OCEAN POLLUTION RESPONSE, supra note 7; ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE, supra note 7. 
18. While the U.S. Navy handles freedom of navigation patrols in other locations, U.S. law gives the Coast 
Guard, an organization with a history of operating in the region, responsibility for Arctic maritime transportation 
and icebreaking. 14 U.S.C. §§ 2 (2018); ELEANOR FREUND, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & 
INT’L AFFAIRS, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 25 (2017); Lt. Sarah 
Janaro, Coast Guard Charted the Northwest Passage in 1957 and Continues to Play a Lead Role in the Arctic 
Today, COAST GUARD COMPASS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2016/08/coast-guard-charted- 
the-northwest-passage-in-1957-and-continues-to-play-a-lead-role-in-the-arctic-today/. 
19. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING 
OF 1.5C 39–40 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2019) (explaining the effects of climate change). 
20. IMO, MEPC 68/21, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) (Jan. 1, 
2017) [hereinafter Polar Code]; Shipping in Polar Waters: International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in 
Polar Waters (Polar Code), IMO, http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
21. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate to the List of SOLAS Certificates and Certificates Issued by 
Recognized Classification Societies, 82 Fed. Reg. 44108 (published Sept. 21, 2017) (codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 
2.01-6(1), 8.320(b)(15) (2018)); Lt. Amy Midgett, Nat’l Maritime Center Issues Instructions Regarding STCW 
Polar Code, COAST GUARD MAR. COMMONS (June 25, 2018), 
http://mariners.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2018/06/25/6-25-2018-natl-maritime-center-issues-instructions- 
regarding-stcw-polar-code/; see also  Member  States,   IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
22. Midgett, supra note 21. 
23. For a summary of environmental shortcomings in the current Polar Code, see Féron, supra note 6, at 
110–11. 
24.For the purposes of U.S. regulation and the Polar Code in the Alaskan Arctic region, “Arctic waters” is 
defined as all areas north of 60 N latitude from the Alaskan coast west from, and inclusive of, the Etolin 
Strait. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 8–9; IMO, Res. MSC 386(94), Amendments to the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea, as Amended, at 1 (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Maritime-Safety-Committee- 
(MSC)/Documents/MSC.386(94).pdf. 
I - SANDERS_18 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2019 11:18 AM 
 
234 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:229 
 
to enforce the regulations, paired with the need to respond to the increased 
environmental damage and mariner casualties that come with heavier vessel 
traffic, would provide the impetus for increased Coast Guard vessel 
appropriations.25 Once built, these vessels would provide the mechanism for 
pressing freedom of navigation through the NSR. 
Further regulation could have other benefits as well. While the current 
Polar Code mitigates the dangers of polar navigation by mandating crew 
requirements and vessel certifications, there are several gaps in regulation, as 
evinced by the IMO’s discussion of further binding polar regulations in the form 
of Polar Code Phase II.26 New U.S. regulation could fill these gaps in U.S. waters 
and inspire the IMO to act. With thousands of ships calling on U.S. ports 
thousands of times each year,27 the Coast Guard’s inspection power—also 
known as Port State Control—has a major impact on global shipping.28 This 
influence, paired with Alaska’s strategic position as an Arctic access point, could 
hold ships from multiple nations to a higher environmental and safety standard, 
thus persuading the IMO to implement Polar Code Phase II on American terms. 
Furthermore, a stronger regulatory regime could reduce the risk of at-sea losses, 
which in turn could lower insurance premiums, incentivizing the use of the 
NSR.29 As more international vessels desire free transit through the NSR, the 
United States’ responsibility for ensuring safe and free navigation would 
increase, adding weight to the need for more Coast Guard ships—referred to as 
cutters.30 
This Note explains how stricter U.S. regulation of Arctic shipping can 
lead to a greater physical presence and peaceful assertion of American 
geopolitical will. Part I lays the groundwork with an overview of how U.S. 
interests are implicated by climate change driving the maritime industry to new 
routes and risks. Part II discusses the current regulatory environment and how 
its shortcomings leave the door open for further rulemaking. Part III examines 
 
25. See Peeken et al., Microplastics in the Marine Realms of the Arctic with Special Emphasis on Sea Ice, 
in ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2018: EFFECTS OF PERSISTENT ARCTIC WARMING CONTINUE TO MOUNT 88, 93 (E. 
Osborne & J. Richter-Menge eds., 2018), https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/ 
Documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2018.pdf. 
26. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO, Ninety-Eighth Session, MSC 98, at 48-50 (23) (June 
30, 2017) [hereinafter MSC Ninety-Eight]. 
27. U.S. COAST GUARD, PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018) 
[hereinafter PORT STATE CONTROL]. 
28. See 46 U.S.C. § 33 (2018); U.S. COAST GUARD, 2 MARINE SAFETY MANUAL: MATERIEL INSPECTION 
D1-1 (2016). 
29. See Huiru Liu, Arctic Marine Insurance: Towards a New Risk Coverage Regime, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
77, 91 (2016). 
30. The Coast Guard refers to its ships greater than sixty-five feet in length as “cutters” because the 
organization’s at-sea law enforcement branch was formerly called the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service. Elliot Snow, 
Preface to HORATIO DAVIS SMITH, EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES REVENUE MARINE SERVICE OR 
(UNITED STATES REVENUE CUTTER SERVICE) 1789–1849, at 1 (Elliot Snow ed., 1932); Assistant Commandant 
for Capability (CG-7): Office of Cutter Forces (CG-751), U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our- 
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Capability-CG-7/Office-of-Cutter-Forces-CG-751/Coast-Guard- 
Cutter-Fleet/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
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the upside of further regulation, how it could provide an impetus for stalled and 
insufficient Coast Guard appropriations, and how—at least here—regulation 
might not be a dissuasive force on industry. Finally, this Note summarizes how 
a U.S. presence, driven by regulatory enforcement, can influence free and safe 
Arctic navigation. 
While inherently connected to the issues discussed here, there are 
several relevant topics this Note will not address in detail. The first is the 
overarching influence of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
treaty (UNCLOS).31 While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS,32 it still 
operates and enforces law consistent with that treaty.33 There are a variety of 
continental shelf and boundary issues stemming from UNCLOS and historical 
claims that form the backdrop for the current geopolitical situation in the 
Arctic.34 These will only be discussed to give context to the effects of a bolstered 
regulatory scheme. 
I. A CHANGING NORTH AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC 
The world is getting warmer.35 Regardless of the cause (although, let’s 
face it, it is the “anthropogenic emissions”), the impacts of atmospheric warming 
are having measurable effects.36 The changes are most dramatic at the poles. 
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
air temperatures in the Arctic are increasing at twice the rate of those in the rest 
of the world.37 Since the middle of the Twentieth Century, sea ice in the Arctic 
Ocean has thinned to the point of being affected by weather and seasonal 
changes.38 In the Bering Sea, ice coverage has reached record lows.39 While it is 
normal for ice coverage to fluctuate with the seasons, Arctic sea ice reaches its 
minimum each September, and since observations began, the trend has been 
toward less ice.40 Ocean areas that once were blocked up with heavy, multi-year 




31. See UNCLOS, supra note 15. 
32. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS: TREATY COLLECTION 2–4 
(2019) https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf. 
33. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 14. 
34. Féron, supra note 6, at 92–105. 
35. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 19. 
36. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5C: HEADLINE 
STATEMENTS FROM THE SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/ 
uploads/sites/2/2018/07/sr15_headline_statements.pdf. 
37. ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2018: EFFECTS OF PERSISTENT ARCTIC WARMING CONTINUE TO MOUNT, supra 
note 25, at 1. 
38. Carol Rasmussen, With Thick Ice Gone, Arctic Sea Ice Changes More Slowly, NASA: JET PROPULSION 
LAB. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news.php?feature=7258. 
39. D. Perovich et al., Sea Ice, in ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2018: EFFECTS OF PERSISTENT ARCTIC WARMING 
CONTINUE TO MOUNT, supra note 25, at 25, 31. 
40. Id. at 25–27; Rasmussen, supra note 38. 
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in recorded history.41 
 
A. THE CHANGING CLIMATE AND OPENING SHIPPING LANES 
The reduction in Bering Sea ice has a direct impact on U.S. interests in 
the region. The Bering Strait is the “chokepoint” for vessels attempting to access 
the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific Ocean.42 Transit through the narrow passage, 
especially those traveling all or part of the Northwest Passage, will necessarily 
pass through U.S. Territorial Waters or the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).43 
Within these areas, the governing nation may regulate and enforce law. In the 
EEZ, the United States claims jurisdiction for the “protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.”44 The receding ice now brings a possible boom, or 
at least a marked increase, in the number of vessels passing through or close to 
pristine U.S. waters.45 
Historically, very few vessels have been able to transit through thick, 
multi-year ice into Arctic waters, especially during the winter months.46 The 
trends of warming and melting, however, show no signs of reversing, and by the 
2030s, ice-free summer navigation will likely be the norm.47 Scientific 
monitoring has shown the sea ice north of Russia—in the NSR—will be 
particularly affected by yearly recession.48 This has allowed the aforementioned 
transits: news-making forerunners of what may soon become routine.49 
The opening of the NSR, and possibly the Northwest Passage, as viable 
shipping lanes could be a boon to shipping companies. A shipping route from 
China to Norway is more than 5,600 nautical miles shorter via the NSR than 
through the Suez.50 Despite slower speeds resulting from transiting through 
lesser-known waters and some thin ice, the NSR reduces travel times by nearly 
fifty percent, and—compared to the Suez—could represent a cost savings of 
$300,000 per transit in fuel alone.51 If the route is reliably ice-free, at least during 
 
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 19, at 205–06; Féron, supra note 6, at 
85; Rasmussen, supra note 38. 
42. Féron, supra note 6, at 91. 
43. See What Is the EEZ?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). Compare Port Access Route Study, 
supra note 6, at 92–117, with OFFICE OF COAST SURVEY, U.S. Maritime Limits & Boundaries, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/data/us-maritime-limits-and- 
boundaries.html#general-information (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) (interactive map: navigate to Alaska). 
44. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983) (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 15 (2018)). 
45. See PORT ACCESS ROUTE STUDY, supra note 6, at 19; Fahey, supra note 3, at 183. 
46. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 43, at 2; Rasmussen, supra note 38. 
47. Muyin Wang & James E. Overland, A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic Within 30 Years: An Update from 
CMIP5 Models, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Sept. 25, 2012, at 1, 1; see Féron, supra note 6, at 85. 
48. See Perovich et al., supra note 39, at 26. 
49. See Embury-Dennis, supra note 1; Goldman, supra note 3. 
50. Gunnarsson, supra note 13. The NWP also represents a 9,000-kilometer (4,800 nautical miles) savings 
over a Panama Canal transit. Féron, supra note 6, at 85. 
51. Transit via the NSR can reduce travel times to as little as twenty-three days compared to forty days 
through the Suez. An open NSR could also save shippers on canal fees, which are at least $5 per ton. Gunnarsson, 
supra note 13. 
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summer months, then it provides a compelling business case for companies 
shipping goods from East Asia to Europe. However, some extra costs are still 
attached to the voyage. The NSR is new and relatively unused, and the shifting 
ice and non-routine nature of the transit means there is little data on how risky 
such transits are, meaning insurers cannot predict the risks.52 This lack of 
predictability adds cost compared to a Suez passage.53 
The big melt also opens up areas potentially rich in natural resources. 
Arctic Alaska alone may hold more than twenty-nine billion barrels of untapped 
oil and hundreds of trillions of cubic feet of natural gas.54 Much of this possible 
future wealth lies in areas likely under U.S. control. While drilling may be some 
years away, this resource richness also foretells an increase in vessel traffic 
through U.S. waters. Climate change also impacts industries with smaller 
vessels. As ocean waters warm, fish vital to the Alaskan fishing industry, like 
pollock, are moving north, retreating towards colder water.55 The fishing fleets 
are chasing them, and there is no ice to stop them.56 
B. ALASKA, MARITIME POLLUTION, AND SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA 
The most immediate concerns, and the impetus for the current 
regulations, are the dangers inherent to Arctic Ocean operations and the 
environmental damage or loss of human life that could occur in the event of a 
marine casualty. While the multi-year ice is receding, and the prospect of 
shipping lanes is a reality, the Arctic is still a hazardous operating environment.57 
Despite diminishing multi-year ice, thin ice sheets with patches of thicker ice 
still abound, summers are prone to consistent fog, and snowstorms and rapidly 
changing temperatures are common.58 Even in summer, the temperature can 
hover near the freezing point, and water temperatures are colder still.59 The route 
itself can be hazardous, too, as the novelty of navigation in the area means that 
not all areas are properly charted.60 These hazards, plus the side-effects of 
normal shipping activities, could contribute to an environmental disaster with 
 
 
52. Liu, supra note 29, at 77–80. 
53. Gunnarsson, supra note 13. 
54. KENNETH J. BIRD ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: 
ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 4, tbl.1 (Peter H. Stauffer ed., 2008), 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
55. Robert Lee Hotz, Climate Change Drives Fish into New Waters, Remaking an Industry, WALL STREET 
J. (Dec. 22, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-drives-fish-into-new-waters- 
remaking-an-industry-11545454860; Kenneth R. Weiss, U.S. Fishing Fleet Pursues Pollock in Troubled Waters, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/19/nation/na-pollock19. 
56. See Hotz, supra note 55. 
57. See AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 10, at 5–7. 
58. Id. 
59. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Station PRDA2—9497645—Prudhoe Bay, AK, 
https://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/view_text_file.php?filename=prda2h2018.txt.gz&dir=data/historical/stdmet/ 
(showing data from the site from 2018). 
60. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. ARCTIC NAUTICAL CHARTING PLAN: SUPPORTING 
SUSTAINABLE MARINE TRANSPORTATION IN ARCTIC ALASKA 6 (2016). 
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long-lasting impacts.61 An oil spill would be devastating to Arctic ecology, and 
the “vast distances” between opening sea lanes and response infrastructure 
would mean protracted and costly cleanup.62 Plastics, sewage, and other waste 
generated by the shipping industry are already starting to raise concerns.63 All 
shipping has risks, but due to its remoteness and pristine nature, the Arctic 
presents a unique environmental challenge. 
Safety of life at sea is another concern. Cold temperatures have negative 
impacts on machinery operation and crew function.64 In the event of mariners 
overboard or otherwise in the water, cold temperatures greatly reduce survival 
times.65 While the Coast Guard has entered into an agreement with other Arctic 
nations to share search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities, the limited number of 
assets available means that some must be diverted from other areas to serve the 
high north.66 The distances from Northwest Passage lanes to infrastructure take 
a toll here, too: from Barrow, on the North shore, to the nearest permanent Coast 
Guard air station is the same distance as from Boston to Miami.67 Because 
cutters are scarce, aircraft are the go-to platform for SAR, but could be miles 
away.68 The harsh conditions do not wait. 
The dearth of Coast Guard resources means that there is no safety net 
in the event of a maritime mishap. This is especially true if an incident occurs in 
waters far from an icebreaker that might be patrolling the Arctic,69 or other 
response assets in southern Alaska.70 It also means that there are no platforms 
with which to challenge the restrictions other Arctic states have placed on the 
opening routes. 
 
C. RUSSIA AND THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION DISPUTE 
The Russians are locking vessels out of the NSR that do not subscribe 
to a Russian regulatory scheme that stretches beyond international norms.71 
Russia has banned nearly all vessels carrying oil or natural gas that do not fly a 
Russian flag.72 By instituting a Northern Sea Route Administration to assert 
 
 
61. Féron, supra note 6, at 105–06. 
62. Id. at 106. 
63. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., VESSEL WASTE A GROWING CHALLENGE IN THE NORTHERN BERING SEA AND 
BERING STRAIT 2 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/04/vessel-waste-a-growing-challenge- 
in-the-northern-bering-sea-and-bering-strait-issue-brief.pdf; Peeken et al., supra note 25, at 88–91. 
64. AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 10, at 13–16. 
65. See, e.g., DR. C.J. BROOKS, SURVIVAL IN COLD WATER 10–14 (2001) (describing the dangers of cold 
water immersion). 
66. ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE, supra note 7, at 4, 12. 
67. Id. at 5. 
68. Id. 
69. The Coast Guard currently only has two, one of which is nearly always dedicated to expeditions in 
Antarctica. 
70. See ARCTIC OCEAN POLLUTION RESPONSE, supra note 7; ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE, supra note 7. 
71. Fahey, supra note 3, at 158–59. 
72. Atle Staalesen, Russian Legislators Ban Foreign Shipments of Oil, Natural Gas and Coal Along 
Northern Sea Route, BARENTS OBSERVER (Dec. 26, 2017), https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2017/12/ 
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domestic control over the NSR, the Russian government hopes to control the 
NSR like its own internal waters,73 and profit via a tariff and mandatory 
icebreaker escorts on most foreign-flagged transport.74 This type of action runs 
contrary to internationally-accepted free-navigation, or “Transit Passage,” 
regimes governing other places where waters used for international transit 
overlie a nation’s territorial seas.75 Russia’s policy directly contradicts U.S. 
Arctic Region Policy.76 
Unlike the United States, however, Russia has the ships and 
infrastructure to enforce its administrative controls. It has forty-six icebreakers, 
seven of which are nuclear powered, with another twelve under construction.77 
Russia is also pouring funds into the region to develop “ports, roads, railways, 
and airports.”78 The United States, meanwhile, is funding just one new 
icebreaker and only recently began examining potential infrastructure projects.79 
Russia is looking ahead and developing a strong Arctic presence at a time when 
U.S.-Russia relations are on the rocks, and the United States could be left out in 
the cold.80 
II. POLAR CODE AND THE LACK OF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESENCE Ideally, 
the Arctic’s convergence of borders and claims, environmental 
changes, and blossoming industry would result in a concerted multilateral effort 
to create a treaty governing the region. This scheme has been successful in 
Antarctica, where competing sovereignty claims have given way to largely 
peaceful scientific cooperation.81 An Arctic treaty of this kind, only ordered 
toward safe, clean transport, as well as scientific research, might make sense in 
 
 
russian-legislators-ban-foreign-shipments-oil-natural-gas-and-coal-along-northern-sea; see also  Fahey,  supra 
note 3, at 159. 
73. Internal waters are treated as “territorial seas” under UNCLOS, over which the governing nation is 
sovereign. UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 2, 8. 
74. Fahey, supra note 3, at 169–71; see also AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 10, at 9; Gunnarsson, 
supra note 13. 
75. UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 37–38; Fahey, supra note 3, at 163. 
76. Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 47, 48–49 (Jan. 9, 2009) (“Freedom 
of  the  seas  is  a  top national priority ....... [T]he  Northern Sea  Route includes  straits  used  for international 
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties 
relating to navigation ...... in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, 
including through strategic straits.”). 
77. Vergun, supra note 16. 
78. Fahey, supra note 3, at 169. 
79. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT INTEGRATED FEASIBILITY REPORT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT (EA), AND DRAFT FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI): ALASKA DEEP-DRAFT ARCTIC 
PORT SYSTEM STUDY 7 (2015); Werner, supra note 16. 
80. See Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, 12 Russian Agents Indicted in Mueller Investigation, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/us/politics/mueller-indictment-russian-intelligence- 
hacking.html; David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. Suspends Nuclear Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/us/politics/trump-inf-nuclear-treaty.html. 
81. See The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
Antarctic Treaty, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
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the future. Today, however, nations have contented themselves with operating 
under the auspices provided by UNCLOS and creating multilateral bodies to 
discuss Arctic policies.82 The resulting international regulatory regime has 
therefore been put in place largely using the IMO.83 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE SO FAR 
The Polar Code is the culmination of years of incremental regulatory 
changes affecting Arctic transit agreed upon at the IMO.84 These new rules 
generally apply by adding provisions to the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),85 and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).86 For example, in 2007, the 
IMO issued Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in 
Remote Areas, which detailed recommendations for passenger ships traveling to 
“exotic destinations,” including ice-covered waters.87 Two years later, the IMO 
issued further guidelines for ships in polar waters, which included non-binding 
recommendations for construction and environmental protections.88 
The current Polar Code is the latest manifestation of international 
regulation in this iterative process. Unlike prior guidelines, however, sections of 
the Polar Code today are binding on IMO member states.89 These sections, while 
delineated in the text of the Polar Code as adopted, in fact take force via 
implementation in relevant portions of the SOLAS and MARPOL agreements.90 
The blanket regulations apply to both Antarctica and the Arctic, and were 
designed “to provide for safe ship operation and the protection of the polar 
environment.”91 The Polar Code applies to vessels of greater than 500 gross 




82. In 2008, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States agreed that “the law of the sea 
provides for important rights and obligations concerning . . . [Arctic] freedom of navigation” and they “therefore 
s[aw] no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” The 
Ilulissat Declaration of May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362 (2009). The United States joined with other nations to form 
the Arctic Council, a cooperative intergovernmental forum. ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: A 
BACKGROUNDER 2, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2076/2017-09- 
25_Arctic_Council_Backgrounder_PRINT_VERSION_NO_LINKS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
83. See Polar Code, supra note 20. 
84. See Anderson, III, supra note 11, at 70–75. 
85. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 
[hereinafter SOLAS]. 
86. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 
1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
87. IMO, A. 999 (25), Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas, at 
3 (Nov. 29, 2007). 
88. IMO, A. 1024 (26), Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, at 2–3 (Dec. 2, 2009). 
89. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 7. 
90. Féron, supra note 6, at 108. 
91. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 5. 
92. 500 gross tonnage was determined by analyzing the corresponding SOLAS agreement under which the 
code took effect and relayed in the U.S. rulemaking. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate to the List of SOLAS 
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from a flag state certifying a vessel’s compliance with the rules.93 
The Polar Code is broken up into two parts, each with a mandatory and 
recommended portion.94 Part I-A mandates safety measures to include for risk 
assessments in icy waters, and special procedures to avoid exceeding ship design 
and crew limitations.95 This includes provisions for new ships to be constructed 
with materials and equipment appropriate to, and with the necessary strength for 
operating in a polar environment.96 Part I-B provides additional optional 
guidance on navigation and safety assessments, including navigating with 
icebreaker assistance, as well as recommended safety equipment.97 
Part II-A focuses on pollution prevention. Crucially, this binding 
portion bans “discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures.”98 It also provides 
for construction requirements to minimize the possibility of oil spill in the case 
of grounding or collision.99 Furthermore, the Code places restrictions on sewage 
and garbage discharge.100 However, the whole of Part II-B, which recommends 
restrictions on carriage of heavy fuel oils and other non-biodegradable materials, 
is non-binding.101 After the Code was approved by the IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and Marine Safety Committee 
(MSC), the Code became binding on member states.102 
Because the United States is party to the SOLAS and MARPOL treaty 
sections impacted by the Polar Code,103 the nation implemented the changes, 
beginning with a rulemaking conducted by the Coast Guard.104 The rulemaking 
updated the regulations governing certificate and inspection programs that the 
Coast Guard and recognized classification societies would have to implement in 
order to comply with the Polar Code’s new requirements.105 The other mandated 
 
 
Certificates and Certificates Issued by Recognized Classification Societies, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,108 (published Sept. 
21, 2017) (codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 2, 8 (2018)). 
93. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 11–12. 
94. Id. at 7. 
95.  Id. at 11–13. 
96.  Id. at 14–20. 
97.  Id. at 29–37. 
98. Id. at 38. 
99.  Id. at 38–39. 
100.  Id. at 39–41. 
101. Id. at 7, 41; see also IMO, Res. MEPC 189 (60), Amendments to MARPOL Annex I to Add Chapter 9— 
Special Requirements for the Use or Carriage of Oils in the Antarctic Area, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter 
Amendments to MARPOL Annex 1]. 
102. Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), 68th Session, 11 to 15 May 2015, IMO, (May 15, 
2015), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-68th-session.aspx. 
103. See IMO, Status of Conventions: Ratifications by State, http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ 
StatusOfConventions/Documents/status-x.xlsx (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
104. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate to the List of SOLAS Certificates and Certificates Issued by 
Recognized Classification Societies, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,108 (Sept. 21, 2017) (codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 2, 8 (2018)). 
105. Id. Classification societies are non-governmental organizations that are delegated authority to conduct 
certain functions on behalf of the Coast Guard, including issuing international certificates. 46 C.F.R. §§ 8.100, 
8.320 (2018). There are multiple classification societies based in various nations, and their authority to act on 
behalf of the Coast Guard is governed by federal regulation. See Recognition of a Classification Society, 46 
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portions of the Polar Code were enacted via a policy letter from the Coast 
Guard’s Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance.106 The result is a system 
where the Coast Guard is required to inspect and enforce the certified portions 
of the Polar Code that had been adopted by regulation.107 Furthermore, under the 
current system, the whole of the Code only applies to twenty-three U.S.-flagged 
vessels,108 although the Coast Guard is required to inspect foreign-flagged 
vessels for compliance.109 
 
B. GAPS IN THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME 
While the Polar Code is a major step towards limiting potential damage 
to the Arctic environment, the manner of its implementation limits it to certain 
vessels and international provisions. While the current scheme should remain in 
effect, its gaps leave the Arctic environment and broad parts of the relevant U.S. 
maritime industry at risk. Additionally, the current Code provisions do not 
provide an impetus for the United States to establish a larger coastal zone 
presence in the U.S. Arctic. The Polar Code’s shortcomings present an opening 
for further regulatory action. 
First, and as a common thread throughout this Part, the United States’ 
implementation of the certified portions of the Code has not created an increased 
appropriations effort on par with its Arctic competitors.110 Nor has the United 
States yet invested in increased Polar zone infrastructure to support the coming 
traffic increases. One reason for this may be that the regulations adopted by the 
Coast Guard only focus on design and certification of vessels, not at-sea spot 
checks.111 Currently, the types of inspections that the Coast Guard conducts to 
ensure compliance with these types of certificate requirements take place in 
major ports, usually pier-side, and therefore outside the Arctic.112 While the 
regulations are good for ensuring appropriate construction standards and safety 
preparation prior to a potential Arctic voyage, the certifications are of 
questionable value if crews are not implementing the Code’s requirements (or 
recommendations) at sea. Without U.S. enforcement assets in the operating area, 
the Coast Guard has no ability to “trust, but verify” that the operating 
requirements of the Code are being implemented.113 
 
 
C.F.R. §§ 8.200–8.260 (2018); INT’L ASS’N OF CLASSIFICATION SOC’YS, Members, 
http://www.iacs.org.uk/about/members/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
106. J. F. WILLIAMS, U.S. COAST GUARD, DHS CG-CVC POLICY LETTER 16-06, at 1 (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CG-CVC/Policy%20Letters/2016/CG- 
CVC_pol16-06.pdf?ver=2016-07-06-120605-907. 
107. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate, 82 Fed. Reg. at 44,115. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 44,117. 
110. See Vergun, supra note 16. 
111. See Adding the Polar Ship Certificate, 82 Fed. Reg. at 44,115. 
112. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 28, at B1-1, D1-1 to -7. 
113. “Trust, but verify” is a Russian proverb that was commonly used by President Ronald Reagan during 
nuclear disarmament talks with the former Soviet Union. Thom Shanker, Battle Turns Gentle with Proverbs 
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The Polar Code also only applies, as implemented, to cargo vessels 
greater than 500 gross tonnage and passenger ships carrying more than twelve 
passengers.114 This is because the regulations took effect internationally via 
chapter XIV of SOLAS, which only applies to ships of the above mentioned size 
or capacity.115 However, this leaves a loophole for smaller vessels. For example, 
a tug-and-barge setup transporting fuel oil to northern communities might avoid 
enforcement. So might other small coastal transport vessels that make more 
frequent trips to areas that are only accessible by air or ship. The regulations 
could also have the unintended effect of incentivizing the use of smaller 
passenger vessels for the Arctic tourism boom,116 which could lead to the use of 
vessels less suited to hazards in the region.117 This limit could also exempt some 
offshore vessels servicing oil exploration in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas,118 
as well as some fish processing vessels.119 Excluding fishing vessels, there were 
more than five thousand transits of the Bering Sea region by vessels of less than 
500 gross tonnage during 2014 and 2015.120 This number is expected to 
increase.121 
Fishing vessels, in general, are not covered by the rules. Fishing vessels 
not only account for most of the vessel traffic through the Bering Sea,122 but are 
also some of the most dangerous.123 Over a fifteen-year period covering the turn 
of the century, U.S. fishing vessels accounted for 40% of major marine 
casualties, as recorded by the Coast Guard.124 With the large number of fishing 
vessels in the region and their spread northward in chase of changing fish 
patterns,125 many vessels not covered by the Code will likely be spending more 
time in colder waters, further from SAR resources and other infrastructure.126 
 
Galore, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 1987), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-12-09-8704010440- 
story.html. 
114. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate, 82 Fed. Reg. at 44,108. 
115. Id. 
116. See Hanna Krueger, Arctic Tourism Is Potential Threat to Environment as Ice Melts, NBC NEWS (last 
updated Jan. 11, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/arctic-tourism-potential-threat- 
environment-ice-melts-n833956. 
117. Currently, most passenger ship traffic carries around 200 passengers. PORT ACCESS ROUTE STUDY, 
supra note 6, at 104. 
118. See id., at 110–12. 
119. See JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING 
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION: SELECTED ISSUES 4 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44566.pdf. 
120. See PORT ACCESS ROUTE STUDY, supra note 6, at 122–24 (including numbers in the study for vessels 
of less than 400GT, which necessarily includes vessels of less than 500GT). 
121. INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. [ICCT], A 10-YEAR PROJECTION OF MARITIME ACTIVITY IN THE 
U.S. ARCTIC REGION 21–24 (2015), https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/CMTS_10- 
Year_Arctic_Vessel_Projection_Report_1.1.15.pdf. 
122. PORT ACCESS ROUTE STUDY, supra note 6, at 107–09. 
123. DAVID H. DICKEY, U.S. COAST GUARD, ANALYSIS OF FISHING VESSEL CASUALTIES: A REVIEW OF 
LOST FISHING VESSELS AND CREW FATALITIES, 1992–2007, at 2 (2008). 
124. Id. 
125. Hotz, supra note 55. 
126. Colder temperatures can have a variety of negative effects on vessels. Ice accumulation on a vessel’s 
topside decks can add weight and make the vessel unstable, potentially leading to catastrophic ends. See, e.g., 
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Although fishing vessels carry less oil and other hazardous liquids than larger 
vessels, they still can pose an ecological danger, either in the event of a sinking 
or other fluid discharge.127 In a show of concern for the Arctic environment, the 
United States has agreed to a moratorium on fishing in the “Central Arctic 
Ocean,” pending scientific research into ecological impacts.128 But the area 
covered by the moratorium is outside of the U.S. EEZ, meaning the U.S. fishing 
fleet is free to fish up to the current ice edge, so long as it remains within 200 
nautical miles of shore.129 While federal regulations govern fishing vessel safety 
and inspections, there is no regulation specifically tailored to fishing vessels 
operating in Polar waters.130 
U.S. implementation of the Polar Code similarly exempts U.S.-flagged 
vessels on domestic voyages.131 The Coast Guard declined to extend the Polar 
Code to domestic voyages as the United States was not bound to do so under the 
SOLAS treaty, and the rulemaking was nothing more than the Coast Guard 
fulfilling its obligations thereunder.132 With the potential exploitation of 
petroleum resources in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas,133 this could leave a 
loophole for tanker vessels transporting crude oil or liquefied natural gas from 
the High Arctic to ports in Alaska or on the West Coast of the United States.134 
Although these vessels are already regulated under MARPOL, the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, and Coast Guard Regulations, tank vessels on domestic voyages to 
the Arctic would have no requirements particular to ice or other hazards of the 
 
 
NAT’L  TRANSP.  SAFETY  BD.,  MARINE  ACCIDENT  BRIEF:  CAPSIZING  AND  SINKING  OF  FISHING  VESSEL 
DESTINATION 10–19, 23, (2018) (finding sea-spray icing in the Bering Sea to be a contributing cause of the 
capsizing and sinking of a fishing vessel that resulted in six fatalities). Federal regulations require an assumed 
amount of icing for stability calculation purposes. See 46 C.F.R. § 28.550 (2018). 
127. See Coast Guard Finds Evidence of Oil Discharge by Fishing Boat, KTUU NEWS (July 20, 2018, 7:39 
AM), https://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Coast-Guard-finds-evidence-of-oil-discharge-by-fishing-boat- 
488731681.html. Eighty-five percent of Alaska oil spills involved less than one barrel of oil. NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.: FISHERIES, Alaska Oil Spill Risk Analysis 2, 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/habitat-conservation/analyzing-risk-improve-oil-spill-planning-and- 
response (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
128. Levon Sevunts, RADIO CAN. INT’L, Binding Agreement on Arctic Fisheries Moratorium Officially 
Signed by EU and Nine Countries, EYE ON THE ARCTIC (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the- 
arctic/2018/10/03/fishing-fisheries-moratorium-agreement-arctic-ocean-europe-union-canada-greenland- 
bouffard/. 
129. See id. 
130. See 46 C.F.R. pt. 28 (2018). 
131. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate to the List of SOLAS Certificates and Certificates Issued by 
Recognized Classification Societies, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,108 (published Sept. 21, 2017) (codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 
2, 8 (2018)). 
132. Id. 
133. See BIRD ET AL., supra note 54. 
134. See, e.g., Craig Welch, Surging Oil Traffic Puts Region at Risk, SEATTLE TIMES (last updated Apr. 20, 
2014, 2:16 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/surging-oil-traffic-puts-region-at-risk/ (identifying 
locations in Washington State with oil refining and transportation hubs); see also Bellamy Pailthorp, The Road 
to Arctic Oil Drilling Runs Through Seattle. People There are Trying to Block It., PRI (June 8, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-06-08/road-arctic-oil-drilling-runs-through-seattle-people-there-are-trying- 
block-it. 
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region, given the Polar Code’s lack of enforcement.135 Other vessels on domestic 
trade or cruise ships dropping passengers in U.S. ports would similarly be 
exempted.136 
The potential for an Arctic oil spill is addressed by the full Polar Code, 
but significant protections were adopted only as recommendations.137 These 
non-binding parts allow non-adopting ships to neglect certain risks to crews and 
the environment. For example, if unfollowed, design requirements to keep 
certain noxious liquids away from the outer hull or current Antarctic restrictions 
on carrying high-density oils could result in heightened environmental damage 
in the event of a grounding or other hull breach.138 Similarly, not adopting 
recommended ice operating limits; navigational, risk, and contingency planning; 
and the carrying of appropriate survival equipment could prove fatal for an 
unprepared or inexperienced crew.139 
On emissions controls and carbon emissions, the Polar Code is silent. 
Black carbon, or soot, an emission from incomplete combustion, coats polar ice 
and accelerates melting.140 The United States is investigating possible remedies 
to combat the problem.141 The problem could become worse with an increase in 
Arctic shipping, as ships are a major source of air pollution.142 The shipping 
industry contributes nearly 3% of total global CO2 emissions, and its impact is 
forecasted to grow.143 
Ballast water management is another area of concern.144 The possibility 
of invasive species transferred to the Arctic via ship’s ballast water is noted in 
Polar Code recommendations, but no restrictions are mandated.145 The United 
States has recently adopted ballast water management regulations, and violations 




135. See Rules for the Protection of the Marine Environment Relating to Tank Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, 
33 C.F.R. pt. 157 (2018); MARPOL, supra note 86; Summary of the Oil Pollution Act: 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
(1990), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-oil-pollution-act (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
136. Vessels conducting transport of goods or people between U.S. ports must be registered in the United 
States. The Jones Act & the Passenger Vessel Services Act, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://help.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-23?language=en_US (last updated Sept. 29, 2019). 
137. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 7; see also supra text accompanying notes 99–103. 
138. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 42. Amendments to MARPOL Annex 1, supra note 101. 
139. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 30–37. 
140. Black Carbon Diesel Initiative in the Russian Arctic, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/black-carbon-diesel-initiative-russian-arctic (last updated May 
23, 2018). 
141. Id. 




144. See PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 15. 
145. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 42. 
146. PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 15. 
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Arctic environment.147 
The IMO and MSC have contemplated the Code’s shortcomings. At 
recent MSC sessions, the committee addressed some of the above concerns by 
opening discussion on a second phase of Polar Code work.148 The MSC 
established a working group to determine what would fall within the wider scope 
of proposals that could make up Polar Code Phase II.149 While they made 
progress in committee discussions, the latest session ended with no amendments 
to the current Code.150 Safety requirements for ships not under SOLAS (such as 
small vessels and fishing vessels) are currently being considered.151 
The gaps in safety, oil spill prevention, and ballast water requirements 
implicate Coast Guard prevention missions. Safety and pollution failures are 
primary drivers for detentions and citations in Coast Guard Port State Control 
inspections.152 Violations of MARPOL accounted for 11% of detentions in 2017, 
and in previous years these were a quarter of all deficiencies.153 Safety 
deficiencies accounted for more than half of all detentions.154 In an industry 
where safety shortcomings are common, heightened scrutiny should be paid 
when vessels and sailors are sent into extreme conditions. 
This is especially true of the Arctic, where the Coast Guard lacks the 
resources to properly field response efforts. The United States’ Arctic concerns 
are also affected by its minimal adoption of the Polar Code. In a year with 
negligible ice coverage, ships could begin transiting the new routes with 
potentially inadequate preparation, pollution controls, and safety equipment. 
The Coast Guard, with its current assets, would be unable to effectively conduct 
SAR, oil spill response, enforce the fishing moratorium, and conduct regional 
checks and port state controls on Polar Code, MARPOL, and ballast water 
violations. 
An extension of this problem is the lack of infrastructure in Arctic 
Alaska. While there are natural economic reasons for this, the undeveloped 
nature of much of the Alaskan coast exacerbates the risk to the mariner, machine, 





147. Féron, supra note 6, at 106 (“An Arctic Council report from 2009 warned that the top environmental 
threats associated with shipping were oil and ballast water discharges.”). 
148. MSC Ninety-Eight, supra note 26, at 48–50; Report of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO, One 
Hundredth Session, MSC 100, at 25 (20) (Jan. 10, 2019) [hereinafter MSC One Hundred]. 
149. MSC One Hundred, supra note 148, at 27–28. 
150. Id. at 27, 34, 43, 65. 
151. Id. at 65. 
152. See PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 12. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 13 (aggregating all categories related to safety equals a sum greater than 50%: firefighting 
appliances, International Safety Management code, lifesaving appliances, safety in general, and safety of life at 
sea). 
155. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 60, at 6. 
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aids to navigation (buoys and lights),156 in an area where help could be hours or 
days away.157 Even if a ship follows the Polar Code and all its recommendations, 
including having a voyage plan in place to appropriately consider places of 
refuge and SAR as mandated,158 there may be little that a vessel in distress can 
do but find an empty, sheltered area, hopefully not icebound, and wait it out. 
It is possible, however, that more regulation would foster more presence 
and potentially more infrastructure. The current regulations may have provided 
some momentum already. On the heels of the Polar Code coming into full effect, 
Congress recently authorized appropriations for (at least) one new icebreaker.159 
While there are doubtlessly a variety of competing priorities for funding, it is 
likely that greater attention on Arctic issues spurred by the rulemaking, news of 
the international agreements (Polar Code, fishing moratorium), and especially 
the standoff with Russia, fueled Congress’ action.160 But the Arctic problem is 
neither going to go away, nor be solved by a single icebreaking cutter—it is only 
going to intensify in coming years. It is better to continue to cast light on the 
challenges the United States faces as an Arctic nation now, than struggle to catch 
up, or clean up, in the future. One way to do so is via increased rulemaking that 
could seek to remedy the gaps in current Polar regulation, reduce risk, and 
thereby make the policy case for more cutters. 
 
III. THE POSITIVE IMPACTS OF INCREASED REGULATION 
A Coast Guard-led rulemaking based on the proposals for Phase II of 
the Polar Code fills in the aforementioned gaps in the current regulatory scheme 
and would provide increased protections for the Arctic environment. While this 
in and of itself is a noble end, this Note proposes that such a regulatory effort 
could set in motion a chain of events with beneficial impacts on trade, the Coast 
Guard, and American foreign policy goals. 
Creating new regulation to influence freedom of navigation, while 
counterintuitive, could lead to this favorable chain of events. First, the new 
regulations should aim to create a safer Arctic environment for both mariners 
and the ecosystem. These new regulations could then serve as a proof-of-concept 
for the international community and form a robust basis on which IMO could 
institute Polar Code Phase II. The resulting increased safety and pollution 
prevention protocols should then correspond to less assessed risk and lower 
insurance costs, thus incentivizing the use of Arctic shipping lanes. This increase 
in shipping would then create a natural need for more Coast Guard assets to 
 
 
156. The furthest-north Aid to Navigation unit servicing Western Alaska is in Kodiak, AK, and travels north 
to service what aids there are. See United States Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Team Kodiak, U.S. COAST 
GUARD, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Portals/8/District%2017/Sector%20Anchorage/SUB%20UNITS/AN 
T%20Kodiak%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf?ver=2017-09-29-172031-997 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
157. See ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE, supra note 7, at 4, 12. 
158. Polar Code, supra note 20, at 26–27. 
159. Werner, supra note 16. 
160. See id. 
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ensure safe and secure navigation. Finally, the combined presence of Coast 
Guard cutters and multinational shippers, eager for free navigation, would place 
pressure on Russia to loosen its restrictions on the NSR. 
 
A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADOPT NEW REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS 
CURRENT REGULATORY SHORTCOMINGS 
The Coast Guard, possibly in collaboration with the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), should 
publish a notice of rulemaking to begin the process of implementing a stricter 
Polar Code. New regulations would reduce risk to the Arctic environment and 
increase safety of life at sea. While numerous stakeholders in the industry would 
need to be consulted in such a rulemaking, especially in the fishing and near- 
shore trades, the United States should seek to cure the shortcomings in the 
current Polar Code. 
As with any new regulatory action, there is a possibility of downsides. 
The Coast Guard has noted it wants to avoid the risk of “potential negative 
actions against their vessels by foreign countries.”161 It is possible that countries 
that do not agree with a U.S. regulatory and inspection program that is stricter 
than international norms might take some action against U.S. vessels that is 
unrelated to Arctic certificates. 
However, this is a risk worth taking. Only vessels seeking transit of 
polar routes would be affected. Most other nations do not have a large stake in 
the Arctic environment or resources, and of those that do, Russia is already 
imposing the most stringent restrictions and denying entry in ways that affect 
U.S. and other non-Russian flags without retribution.162 Furthermore, the United 
States has instituted ballast water management regulations that do not 
correspond to international treaty and come with no discernable deleterious 
effects to trade.163 A stricter U.S. code could protect U.S. interests, incentivize 
appropriations, and reduce risk, thus outweighing the potential drawbacks of 
foreign port-state inspection retribution. 
First, the rulemaking proposal should seek to close the loophole for 
vessels on U.S. domestic voyages. This would mandate equal safety and 
environmental protocols for every vessel over 500 gross tonnage undertaking 
polar transit. Second, the new rule should aim to adopt the Polar Code Phase II 
controls as discussed at the MSC’s one hundredth session.164 These elements, 
especially regarding vessels below 500 gross tonnage, would reduce some of the 
 
 
161. Adding the Polar Ship Certificate to the List of SOLAS Certificates and Certificates Issued by 
Recognized Classification Societies, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,115 (published Sept. 21, 2017) (codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 
2, 8 (2018)). 
162. Fahey, supra note 3, at 158–59. Canada also has access restrictions but is not taking as active a role in 
precluding transit. See Féron, supra note 6, at 91–92. This is due, in part, to heavier ice in the NWP, as well as 
Canada having an icebreaker deficiency similar to that of the United States. Stephens, supra note 12, at 8–9. 
163. See PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 15. 
164. See supra Subpart II.B.; see also supra text accompanying notes 149–151. 
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risk prevalent among smaller vessels and fishing vessels.165 Tiered restrictions 
here would be desirable. 
Larger vessels—more likely to be owned or operated by a multinational 
corporation—should have stricter certificate requirements and environmental 
controls to correspond to their greater size and greater capacity for spill damage. 
MARPOL and SOLAS already seem to consider this, since vessels of less than 
500 gross tonnage are not covered. But, given the large number of smaller 
vessels in the Arctic trade,166 creating code requirements for the smaller vessels, 
especially new safety standards, could save lives. This is particularly relevant as 
fishing fleets move north into colder waters; a greater Coast Guard presence, for 
both fishing enforcement and SAR, would be wise to follow. However, as 
smaller vessels do not necessarily have the same resources to effect changes as 
major vessels do, different, less restrictive rules should be applied. 
New restrictions should also be applied for oil, discharge, and Arctic- 
specific ballast water controls. The optional portions of the current Polar Code 
regarding high density oils, non-biodegradable materials, and ballast water 
discharge should be made mandatory. This would reduce the risk of spills in the 
event of wrecks and accidental discharge. It would also provide an enforcement 
basis in these cases and in cases of purposeful discharge. Ballast water 
management controls that are specifically designed for the Arctic environment 
would minimize the likelihood of invasive species impact. Ballast water 
treatments that are safe for Arctic waters should also be mandated.167 
Finally, the Coast Guard should work with the EPA to develop 
appropriate emissions standards to reduce black carbon (and greenhouse gasses 
generally). While this is not an item listed in the current Polar Code, nor in recent 
MSC session reports, it is an area of environmental concern which the United 
States shares with Russia,168 and would be a useful point of common ground as 
the Arctic geopolitical situation develops. Additionally, since implementation of 
carbon controls is costly for ship-owners, the government could implement 
financing options or other financial incentives to accommodate these increased 
costs.169 Given how such regulations could have a broad impact on various 
nations’ Arctic merchant fleets, as well as how closely the regulations could hew 
to proposed Phase II plans, international regulation might follow on America’s 
heels. 
 
B. U.S. REGULATION AS A BASIS FOR IMO POLAR CODE PHASE II 
A Coast Guard rulemaking could solidify a framework for an 
international Polar Code Phase II and inspire IMO to implement such a code in 
 
165. See DICKEY, supra note 123, at 4. 
166. See PORT ACCESS ROUTE STUDY, supra note 6, at 90. 
167. Congress ratifying International Ballast Water Management Convention standards might also help 
reduce invasive species risk. See PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 15. 
168. Black Carbon Diesel Initiative in the Russian Arctic, supra note 140. 
169. See id. 
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a way that hews closely to U.S. policy. While U.S. rulemaking can take years,170 
the duration of international negotiations can sometimes be even longer.171 If the 
United States moves quickly to adopt new regulations, the Coast Guard could 
begin enforcement of the new terms and provide an example for the 
effectiveness and feasibility of such a regime. The United States could also use 
its influence to apply pressure to IMO to adopt Phase II in its vision in a variety 
of ways. 
First, the United States could apply pressure via Coast Guard Port State 
Controls. The United States, as a leading economy, receives numerous ships into 
its ports every year.172 The Coast Guard has the statutory authority to inspect 
these vessels in U.S. waters and enforce regulations.173 To access the Arctic, 
many vessels will have to pass through Bering Sea waters controlled by the 
United States, which provides an opportunity for U.S. inspections. Any Arctic- 
bound or Polar Certificate vessel that calls on a U.S. port would have to comply 
with these proposed regulations. If most shipping companies are facing 
heightened compliance requirements during calls on U.S. ports anyway, then no 
burden is added if these requirements become international law because they 
will already be in compliance. Therefore, there would likely be less opposition 
from industry groups to a stricter international code than there might be without 
U.S. regulation as a forerunner. 
Second, the rules implemented by the United States will not be a 
surprise: they would already be based on discussions that have happened at the 
MSC and IMO.174 U.S. implementation could therefore serve as a proof-of- 
concept for the international community on how to apply and enforce the new 
rules, and under what auspices to adopt them (safety standards, oil, emissions, 
etc.). Industry concerns would be reflected in the comment portion of the 
rulemaking and would be available in the Federal Register, removing some of 
the guesswork from MSC. 
Additionally, a regulatory scheme that puts the United States on more 
even footing with the rules imposed by the Russian and Canadian governments 
creates regulatory parity among major players at the Pole. If industry 
stakeholders know that the regulations across much of the NSR and Northwest 
Passage have parity, then it can adapt to new regulations faster and without fear 
of multiple standards with which to comply. This would be cheaper for industry 
and in turn, could improve negotiations in the IMO or Arctic Council when 
drafting new agreements  for  Arctic transit.  If  multiple nations have similarly 
 
170. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF 
OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 18, fig.2 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09205.pdf. 
171. See generally Nicole M. Simonelli, Bargaining over International Multilateral Agreements: The 
Duration of Negotiations, 37 INT’L INTERACTIONS 147 (2011) (examining the duration of international 
multilateral agreement negotiations). 
172. See PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 27, at 1. 
173. See Vessels Subject to Inspection, 46 U.S.C. § 3301 (2018). 
174. See MSC One Hundred, supra note 148, at 25–28. 
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strict environmental and safety requirements, then there is less to negotiate— 
common standards might be more easily reached. 
There is also the not-inconsiderable portion of the IMO budget that the 
United States provides. The United States is one of the largest contributors to 
IMO funding, both assessed as a share based on economic factors and as a 
voluntary contributor.175 While the total amount is relatively small compared to 
U.S. spending generally,176 threatening less—or better, offering more—as well 
as making offshoot agreements with partner nations, could incentivize 
multilateral agreement in a way that follows U.S. policy preferences. 
Furthermore, scholars maintain that the United States, in its role as a 
global hegemony, sets the example in environmental protection that the rest of 
the world follows.177 Whether the United States leads or chooses to “veto” an 
international agreement, the nation often prevails in ensuring international 
protocols are drafted in accordance with its position.178 The United States has 
used this power to influence maritime agreements to align with its foreign policy 
goals.179 
Finally, there is precedent for international regulation following U.S. 
regulatory efforts. In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster, the United 
States Congress pushed through the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, ushering in new 
cleanup and construction requirements for oil tankers, other vessels, and 
maritime operators.180 The international community followed suit, and by 1993, 
had adopted U.S. recommendations for tanker construction and inspection.181 
With the current focus of conversation on Arctic policy, a similar course could 




C. INCREASED REGULATION PROMOTES A SAFER ENVIRONMENT AND COULD 
INCENTIVIZE POLAR NAVIGATION 
While regulation can often dissuade industry activity, the situation in 
the Arctic, when viewed in the context of global shipping costs, presents an 
opportunity for government and industry to align interests. Although a 
 
 
175. Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2017: Report of 
the External Auditors, IMO 54 (2018), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Documents/Financial%20Statements/ 
IMO%20Financial%20Statements%202017.pdf. 
176. See id. at 54–55. 
177. Paul G. Harris, International Environmental Affairs and U.S. Foreign Policy, in THE ENVIRONMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 3, 4 (Paul G. Harris ed., 2001); see also John Barkdull, 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Ocean Environment: A Case of Executive Branch Dominance, in THE 
ENVIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND U.S. FOREIGN Policy, supra note 177 at 134, 152. 
178. Barkdull, supra note 177, at 152. 
179. Id. 
180. See Background, IMO, http://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/oilpollution 
/pages/background.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
181. Id. 
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regulatory scheme following the framework outlined above would create short- 
term costs, it is possible that regulations promoting increased crew and 
environmental safety could drive down insurance costs—a significant factor in 
the shipping industry.182 The long-term benefits of such a scheme, then, would 
not only outweigh initial costs, but also help decrease other expenditures and 
externalities as vessels move north in search of shorter routes and natural 
resources. 
First, it is important to note that Arctic transits through Alaskan waters 
are forecast to increase, regardless of any rulemaking.183 Less ice will mean 
more ships.184 Some parts of the industry will have no choice but to operate in 
the Arctic. Fishing vessel traffic will increase as the stocks shift north.185 With 
the probable exploitation of Arctic natural resources, drilling and mining 
companies will have a heavy incentive to chase profits and increase shipments 
of products that cannot be moved via pipeline.186 Even if new regulations create 
additional costs for these portions of the industry, the incentive for these mostly 
U.S. domestic-transit vessels to work their way further north will outweigh the 
costs. 
In this situation, regulations are still advisable to diminish risk. 
Moreover, there are currently higher costs associated with trans-Arctic trade 
than via other traditional routes, like the Suez.187 New regulation could mitigate 
some of those costs, especially due to its potential impact on insurance rates. 
Insurance plays a major role in international shipping.188 Vessels cannot 
make certain transits without insurance or if the risk is deemed too high. The 
risky nature of Arctic transit means that, so far, securing insurance has been more 
difficult and costlier than traditional shipping routes.189 In the past, this, as well 
as multi-year ice, has been a bar to Arctic transportation. More regulation eases 
insurers’ concerns and makes them more likely to provide insurance; to them, 
regulation signals decreased risk and provides insurers with parameters to assess 
risk and cost.190 
Regulations like Polar Code Phase II create higher safety and 
environmental standards and therefore reduce risk. This could lower insurance 
rates and increase coverage for compliant vessels. It is also possible that 
insurance companies will lobby lawmakers to provide funding for 
implementation infrastructure commensurate with the new regulations: in this 
 
 
182. See Liu, supra note 29, at 78. 
183. See ICCT, supra note 121, at 3–4, 60–61. 
184. Id. at 62. 
185. Hotz, supra note 55. 
186. See ICCT, supra note 121, at 25–28. 
187. Gunnarsson, supra note 13. 
188. See Liu, supra note 29, at 78. 
189. Gunnarsson, supra note 13. 
190. Liu, supra note 29, at 91; Stephens, supra note 12, at 6–7. In this way, the insurance industry flouts the 
common-held belief of regulation dissuading an industry’s activities. 
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case, Coast Guard assets.191 Faced with potential losses, should an ill-prepared 
vessel founder or discharge pollutants in the Arctic, insurers may be a “reluctant 
but influential source[] of additional pressure.”192 
It is possible that shippers and insurers may resist regulatory measures 
as onerous up-front costs and maintain the status quo. However, Arctic routes 
hold other advantages over traditional routes that insurers should find appealing. 
Compared to transit via the Suez, the Arctic routes also do not (currently) have 
a risk of piracy or international conflict.193 Arctic routes are also shorter in both 
distance and duration, which means less time vessels are at sea and exposed to 
underway mishaps. Additionally, if actuaries determine that implementing 
regulatory requirements would significantly decrease risk, then it is possible 
insurance underwriters will impose the requirements on shippers through some 
form of industry audit.194 If the risks of Arctic shipping can be predicted and 
mitigated by preparations forced by regulation, then Arctic routes could appear 
even more lucrative to insurers, as compared to the historical alternatives. When 
the rates drop, shippers will seek the cheaper alternative: they will want to use 
the NSR. 
If new regulations end up wooing more shipping to Arctic lanes, there 
could be negative ramifications regionally. The United States may merely be 
trading environmental damage to the Arctic for geopolitical gains and localized 
environmental regulation. Conversely, the decrease in fuel oil consumed due to 
the shorter transit could mean better long-term effects for the planet at large. The 
savings in fuel and voyage duration naturally correlates to a reduction in carbon 
emissions.195 Because the shipping industry is a major contributor to greenhouse 
gasses, over a period of years, lower emissions from hundreds of vessels could 
portend a reduction in global carbon emissions.196 
The consequence of increased safety via regulation should be lower 
costs. The incentive for shippers to navigate via the NSR will be threefold: lower 
insurance costs—or at least more predictable rates and removal of the case-by- 
case system currently employed—decreased fuel costs, and lower carbon 
emissions.197 As a result, the cost of transit via Arctic routes will decrease over 
time. After the initial capital costs related to implementing the regulations, 
shippers will be able to recoup this cost in what is saved and will have an 
economic incentive to trade along polar routes. The resulting increase in ships 
 
 
191. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES 265 (2d ed. 
2006). 
192. Id. 
193. ICCT, supra note 121, at 32; see also Gunnarsson, supra note 13, at 32. Rania El Gamal, Saudi 
Arabia Halts Oil Exports in Red Sea Lane After Houthi Attacks, REUTERS (July 25, 2018, 1:18 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/saudi-arabia-halts-oil-exports-in-red-sea-lane-after-houthi- 
attacks-idUSKBN1KF0XN. 
194. See ANDREWS, supra note 191, at 265; Liu, supra note 29, at 91. 
195. Gunnarsson, supra note 13. 
196. OLMER ET AL., supra note 142, at 2. 
197. See Gunnarsson, supra note 13. 
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will need both inspection and protection. 
 
D. REGULATIONS NEED TO BE ENFORCED—THE CASE FOR MORE COAST 
GUARD CUTTERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
An enhanced regulatory regime, and the forecasted consequent increase 
in ship traffic, may provide a combined impetus for increased appropriations for 
Coast Guard Arctic assets. The Coast Guard will have an increased burden: 
vessel traffic will need to be monitored, the new regulations would need to be 
enforced, and assets would need to be on-hand in the event of an emergency. In 
short, the Coast Guard would have a greater need to conduct its domestic 
statutory missions, as there will be more vessels in the Arctic and a stricter 
enforcement code. But first, it needs more ships. The Coast Guard cannot buy 
its own ships; it needs Congress. But the Coast Guard can create enforceable 
regulations consistent with its statutory authority, then lobby to Congress that it 
cannot effectively enforce the law. Having industry on its side in this effort will 
only strengthen the agency’s cause. 
Despite the risk of unfavorable port state control implications or 
citations, it benefits mariners to have ample Coast Guard assets on hand. The 
Coast Guard should be equipped to respond to SAR cases, oil spills, and provide 
icebreaking services. Industry should already be persuaded to want free and open 
navigation based on the aforementioned cost savings, but it also stands to benefit 
from the safety net of search and rescue, and oil spill response that the Coast 
Guard can provide. 
Infrastructure projects would also be a boon to support increased 
shipping and Coast Guard presence. The nearest deepwater port to the North 
Slope is a thousand miles away in Dutch Harbor.198 The Coast Guard and Army 
Corps of Engineers are investigating the possibility of new port development 
further north.199 It would be wise to have new regulations in place first, before 
the big ships arrive and start using these nascent Alaskan ports, or before they 
begin transporting petroleum products. This is especially important because any 
domestic use will not be covered by the current Code. 
The final step before effective Arctic presence—and influence—is 
appropriations. The Coast Guard needs more ships to keep mariners safe, 
respond to disasters, and promote the U.S. freedom of navigation policy. This 
step is also the most difficult to predict. While it is natural to assume that 
Congress will fund the necessary pieces for the Coast Guard to effect its statutory 
and regulatory missions, this is an untestable hypothesis. It is possible that 
Congress could “impliedly repeal” the Coast Guard’s mission and the 
 
198. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 79, at 6. 
199. See id. at 14, 15–21 (investigating the feasibility of various port development projects in Alaska); Ben 
Werner, Coast Guard Commandant Hopeful FY 2019 DHS Budget Will Be Approved With Icebreaker Funding, 
U.S. NAVAL INST.  NEWS  (Dec.  7,  2018,  10:29  AM),  https://news.usni.org/2018/12/07/39423  (“Long-  
term . . . it’s possible the Coast Guard would look to create  a  permanent  presence  in  the  Arctic.  Most  
likely . . . the Coast Guard would look for a sea base, possibly in the far northern Port Clarence area.”). 
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Executive’s foreign policy goals.200 In this way, Congress may underfund the 
agency and exert some control over its activity.201 
There are compelling reasons, however, to predict that Congress might 
follow through. First, it is an intuitive step that an expanded regulatory regime 
leads to an expanded presence or rule of law. History shows that agencies grow 
when they have an increased regulatory burden. For example, even during the 
regulation-unfriendly Reagan era, legal staffs enforcing environmental 
regulations grew by an order of magnitude.202 In the fifty years since the 
National Environmental Protection Act, executive agencies have learned how to 
use environmental issues to promote their interests, engage in foreign policy, 
and justify appropriations.203 
Likewise, industry is no longer uniformly opposed to regulatory 
measures, especially where there is a competitive advantage to be gained.204 In 
the Arctic there is a “win-win” opportunity: market players who can adopt polar 
transit can gain a competitive advantage by transporting goods at a reduced 
cost.205 With regulation likely to lower insurance rates, then gaining this 
competitive advantage is in these firms’ interest. They could lobby for Congress 
to back the Coast Guard’s mission. 
This is especially true given that players in the maritime industry have 
accepted the need for environmental and lifesaving protections.206 
Environmental protections help preserve natural resources that segments of the 
industry rely upon, and all mariners should appreciate the safety net provided by 
the Coast Guard’s expert search and rescue capabilities. Furthermore, there is an 
element of political reality: shipbuilding funnels federal money to congressional 
districts and campaign donors. With industry and government aligned, and with 
some lawmakers positioned to make political hay, it is possible that once 
regulations are in place, appropriations to support enforcement will follow. 
One unintended consequence is that the increased regulation could lead 
to a belief of a nominally safer Arctic, reducing the need for Coast Guard 
response assets. This would be misplaced faith in the power of spilling ink. 
Without a Coast Guard presence in the region, there would be no enforcement 
or security mechanism for ships traveling through U.S. waters but not making 
port. For any port or offshore resource exploitation activity that develops, there 
would be limited spill response capabilities and no on-scene inspection teams. 
Without any ability to enforce regulations in the Arctic, the United 
 
200. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 550 (3d ed. 2017). 
201. See id. 
202. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 115 (2004). 
203. Harris, supra note 177, at 21. 
204. Robert Falkner, Business Conflict and U.S. International Environmental Policy: Ozone, Climate, and 
Biodiversity, in THE ENVIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 177, at 
157, 162. 
205. Id. 
206. LAZARUS, supra note 202, at 163. 
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States must rely on other nations to enforce the current Polar Code and hope 
Phase II, when promulgated, is put into place properly. Appropriations should 
follow regulation. Otherwise, the U.S. could be left holding the bag when 
tragedy strikes a foreign-flagged vessel transiting north of Alaska with 
inadequate safety equipment. Therefore (regardless of the Russia situation), 
there is still an impetus for increased Coast Guard presence, if only to inspect 
for compliance and respond to maritime disasters. 
There is also some likelihood of a major disaster occurring before the 
Coast Guard receives the assets or funding necessary to implement Arctic safety 
and security. All too often, regulation and Coast Guard appropriations follow 
tragedies, instead of preceding or preventing them. Following the Exxon Valdez 
spill, global regulations for tanker construction changed.207 After the wreck of 
the Edmund Fitzgerald on Lake Superior in 1975, the Coast Guard added cutters 
to the region to be on call for major SAR events.208 The entirety of the SOLAS 
Convention sprouted from the Titanic tragedy.209 
Two mishaps, although separated by decades, show the hazards of far- 
north navigation and the importance of rapid Coast Guard response. In 1980, the 
cruise ship Prinsendam caught fire and listed in the Gulf of Alaska.210 There was 
an “awesome sense of tragedy averted” as the Coast Guard and a nearby tanker 
rescued all 320 passengers and 203 crew.211 More recently, the 2004 wreck of 
the Selendang Ayu in the Aleutians did not end so fortuitously. The freighter lost 
power and grounded in heavy weather.212 Six died and more than 300,000 
gallons of oil spilled; the clean-up took two years.213 While the Selendang Ayu 
was a tragedy, it certainly would have been worse with no Coast Guard response: 
the Coast Guard saved twenty lives and aided in the cleanup operation.214 
Governments and industry should learn from history and apply appropriate 
regulatory remedies and SAR platforms before a disaster strikes. It should not 
take tragedy to inspire regulation. Ships are heading north anyway; the United 
States should make transit as safe for the environment and mariners as possible. 
 
 
207. Background, supra note 180. 
208. Hugh E. Bishop, Edmund Fitzgerald: Decades of Speculation, Fascination and Grieving, LAKE 
SUPERIOR MAG. (Mar. 10, 2001), https://www.lakesuperior.com/the-lake/maritime/225feature/; see also 
USCGC Alder, U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-9/Ninth- 
District-Staff/Prevention-Division/Cutters/ALDER/History/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
209. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety- 
of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 




212. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT BRIEF: ACCIDENT NO. DCA-05-MM-008, at 15 
(2006), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAB0601.pdf. 
213. Id. at 14–15. The accident also resulted in the wreck of a Coast Guard helicopter when it was engulfed 
in a massive wave. The crew was rescued. Id. at 13–14. 
214. Id. at 1, 14–15. 
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As of this writing, Congress authorized appropriation of a new Coast 
Guard icebreaker, with the possibility of a second.215 Even if the Coast Guard 
gets both ships, this would not be enough to cover the vast stretches of ocean 
and respond to heightened traffic loads all summer long. Even though the Coast 
Guard says they are asking for six ships, only one is currently fully authorized, 
and there is no bill authorizing more than the current $655 million allocated.216 
Even then, any icebreaker program that was started in early 2019 might not be 
ready until 2025.217 To have an effective presence in the Arctic by the time the 
shipping lanes will likely be open all summer,218 Congress should move towards 
appropriations now. As demonstrated above, enhanced regulation should be an 
aid in lobbying towards this end. 
The Coast Guard should aim at, and Congress should fund, building 
enough cutters not just to enforce strict regulations, but also to be able to 
simultaneously and immediately respond to a vessel in distress in one location 
and escort vessels through the NSR or Northwest Passage. Heavy icebreakers to 
facilitate winter operations would also be ideal, especially given possible Alaska 
infrastructure projects.219 Additionally, existing Arctic communities need winter 
resupply, and they should not have to rely on Russia.220 Finally, a capable Coast 
Guard force in the Arctic would be able to promote freedom of navigation 
throughout the region. 
 
E. PRESENCE EQUALS INFLUENCE: PRESSURE ON RUSSIA AND FREEDOM OF 
NAVIGATION IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 
In 2018, Admiral Schultz, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, while 
discussing hoped-for icebreaker appropriations, said, “[P]resence equals 
influence.”221 Under the chain of events predicted here, the Coast Guard will 
have an incentive and industry support to provide force projection via freedom 
of navigation operations and icebreaker escorts. With global shippers aligned 
with U.S. policy interests, there will be international public and private pressure 
on Russia to change its restrictive NSR policies. A well-equipped Coast Guard 
can benefit industry, while simultaneously promoting U.S. freedom of 
navigation policy. 
Currently, the vessels allowed to transit the NSR are paying high fees 
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to Russia for route access and mandatory icebreaker escorts.222 Russia has the 
icebreaker assets,223 as well as the infrastructure investments to potentially 
support a larger number of transports, but it is restricting access nonetheless.224 
The United States is planning to conduct freedom of navigation patrols in the 
region,225 but lacks sufficient icebreaker support for current conditions.226 An 
enlarged Coast Guard presence would support this end and industry’s ends, as 
well. While outright naval force projection into the NSR could risk provoking a 
Russian military response,227 challenging Russian restrictions as an economic 
measure, as opposed to a military one, might not engender an aggressive 
reaction. 
For example, an international convoy of ships from different flag states, 
all agreeing to attempt an NSR passage, might be escorted by a team of 
American icebreakers. Such an effort could be framed as an economic and 
environmental imperative. Multilateral economic pressure, with civilian ships 
and the Coast Guard knocking on Russia’s door, as opposed to an explicitly 
armed naval presence, might have a gentler persuasive influence on Russian 
policy. 
A less aggressive approach such as this might also garner support from 
other nations who would benefit from an open NSR, especially China,228 who 
could otherwise be leery of an overt U.S. Naval presence.229 The situation in 
Crimea and the Kerch Strait demonstrate that Russia is unpredictable in its 
actions and not subject to international norms. However, it is possible that in the 
next decade, as the thawing ice removes one obstacle to Arctic transit, the chain 
of events described here could help thaw tensions and remove political obstacles, 
too.230 A joint U.S.-Chinese convoy pushing to open a trade route might be too 
much to ask, but with both nations aligned on free navigation there is potential 
for these economic powers to apply pressure together for opening the more 
economical trade routes.231 
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2019,232 such an effort has rightly met with criticism.233 A Coast Guard-led, 
industry-supported effort to open navigation makes more sense than a Naval 
force projection, especially given a Coast Guard icebreaker’s ability to extricate 
itself from any embarrassing situation that could otherwise occur with a naval 
standoff.234 Not only does the Coast Guard have statutory authority over Arctic 
operations to secure safe maritime shipping, but the optics of a Coast Guard 
icebreaker leading a tanker through light summer ice (without imposing a fee) 




Under an industry-backed implementation of U.S. freedom of 
navigation policy and force projection, a U.S. presence would create an 
influence on its Arctic neighbors. This could flow from increased regulation. 
Following U.S. rulemaking, the IMO might be persuaded to implement Phase II 
of the Polar Code based on this tested American framework. This, in turn, could 
reduce assessed risk and lower insurance rates; the risk reduction could spur 
insurance and industry partners to move to more cost-effective Polar transits. 
Then, not only would the Coast Guard have the regulatory authority to conduct 
inspections and hold vessels transiting the Arctic accountable for more 
environmental and safety certifications, but it would also have industry support 
in a push for appropriations. In this way, the combined presence of Coast Guard 
and industry could add up to influence Russia to change its Northern Sea Route 
restrictions. 
This Note suggests a novel, if counterintuitive perspective: that a well- 
ordered regulatory scheme can both create an impetus for enforcement, and— 
under the right circumstances—save industry money. It is possible, of course, 
that this premise, admittedly untestable, is false. Heightened regulation and its 
associated cost may simply serve to dissuade the shipping industry from 
advancing efforts to normalize Arctic routes. If this were to occur, an enhanced 
regulatory scheme would still serve to reduce risk of a catastrophic mishap and 
protect the local region. The opening of Arctic routes with a safety net of Coast 
Guard assets and environmental protections should provide a “win-win” 
situation for government and industry. Regardless of forthcoming Coast Guard 
appropriations, the minimal U.S. presence currently in the region means Russian 
restrictions cannot be effectively challenged and a freedom of navigation policy 
cannot currently be enforced. 
The United States should take measures to adopt Polar Code Phase II 
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pro-emission-reduction regulatory scheme, international shippers would have 
more incentive to adopt new routes, especially through the NSR. Through a 
desire for lower costs and shorter routes, industry could place pressure on Russia 
via direct lobbying, working with U.S. assets to navigate the NSR without 
Russian assistance, and by influencing other states’ governments to place 
increased pressure on Russia to do away with its NSR lockouts and tariffs. 
Incentivizing industry to responsibly and sustainably transit the Arctic serves to 
create a demand for transit past Russia at a level its government might not be 
able to extort. And, if corporations are sufficiently bold enough to challenge or 
flout Russian restrictions (with or without U.S. assistance), a military 
confrontation in the area might be avoided. Most importantly, mariners and the 
environment would be better protected from harm in the days and years to come. 
